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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 991050-CA 
vs. : 
Priority No. 2 
MARTHA JANE HOWELL, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals her conviction of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict 
based upon the sufficiency of the evidence? 
Standard of review. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant 
"'must first marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then demonstrate 
how this evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light, is insufficient to support the 
verdict.'" State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App. 305,125, 989 P.2d 503 (citation omitted) 
{quoting State v: Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994)). This Court "will reverse 
a conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is 'so inconclusive or so 
inherently improbable that "reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" 
that the defendant committed the crime.'" State v. Harley, 1999 UT App. 197, % 9, 982 
P.2d 1145 {quoting State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) and State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are at issue in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated assault. She moved to 
sever the two counts, and the second count was dismissed. Defendant was convicted by 
a jury of the remaining count (R.70). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 0-5 years, with the sentence 
suspended, and defendant was ordered to serve sixty days in jail and 36 months probation 
(R.89). Defendant timely appealed (R.93). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant had a rocky four-year relationship with William Roberts during which 
they lived together off and on (R. 109:128). In February, 1999, Roberts and defendant 
were living apart. Defendant and her three children (Seth, age 10 at the time of this 
incident, Shawn, age 8, and Sabrina, age 4) were living in a two-bedroom apartment in 
2 
M tin <\y i i|,>h 'I-' |M'i "H - ^ *»-.<>#>, 11 iv i | vfrmLnii ulso had a roommate, Jack Scott, a 
r^rirr,: who slcri either on the couch or in a motor home parked outside the apartment 
(R. 11 )v ^ f "*' Roberts \\ as living in Springs ill T T*"h and would travel up to Murray 
on weekends u * K-»M Ucl^R; . ' ^ 
IUII 1 \ oin 1 i*ula\ .nlli'iii'iHUi ill III1!,] ILiiiil i iillnl K hols ill wiwl and asked if he 
w o u j c l c o m e Up to her apartment that night (R.109:130). Roberts agreed, but told 
defendant that he needed to do some laundry and ^hopping first (Id ^ While Mu>pp 
Roberts bought a Barbie doll as a gift tor < . . >ui w, 
«l«i" I'M11' I Ml ll«, I'-iukul i \\\m biif? tnMli • -k-< J-uiihedoli i i i i ivR.iU9:lj3). 
Because Roberts' car1 was not running, he had to take a bus to Murray, and did not arrive 
at defendant's apartment until 10:00 p.m. (Id.). 
When i - iiiiu aii 
fend u-• iUrco children and a iU->ear-oid friend, Jeiw*v 
Seegmiller, were watching a video in the bedroom closest to the living room, and fn 
entrance (R.96,108-09). Defendant was angry because Roberts was. late (R. 10-
 s ... . 
hack rR,109:133-34). When Roberts pulled the doll out of his bag to give it io dt t 
and Sahrina, defendant mocked him for bringing her a doll ( R . 1 0 9 : P ^ ^ udain hen 
told Roberts that she had paged him, and asked why lie had IIn • ^ ; 
rvuutUS 
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explained that he could not answer the page because he was on the bus, and said "if you 
want me to go, I'll go" (R.109:135). He then asked to use the telephone to call for a ride, 
because he had traveled by bus and could not catch another one at that hour (Id.). 
Roberts tried to call his mother, who was asleep, and then tried to call a friend, 
who was not home. Defendant came in and said "who you calling, your girlfriend?" 
(Id.). Roberts said "no, you know better than that," and defendant dialed *69 on the 
telephone to see whom Roberts had called (Id.). Roberts then tried to make another call, 
and defendant jerked the phone away from him and told him to "go use the phone 
somewhere else" (R. 109:136). Roberts said "okay, whatever," and prepared to leave by 
putting his coat on and picking up his bag. Defendant then came to the bedroom door 
holding a knife. Roberts said "hey, don't worry, I'm out of here," and walked to the 
front door (R. 109:136-37). 
As he was reaching for the door, Roberts saw defendant approach with the knife 
out of the comer of Jiis eye. He turned, raising his arm to protect himself, and defendant 
stabbed him in the upper arm (R. 109:137-38). The stab wound was very painful, and 
Roberts fell to the floor. He got up, yelling, and left the apartment (R. 109:138). 
After he left defendant's apartment, Roberts knocked on other apartment doors 
until he found someone home who could call for help (R. 109:138-39). An ambulance 
and the police arrived within a few minutes, and Roberts was taken to the hospital for 
treatment of a two-inch stab wound to his upper arm (R. 109:69) 
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As soon as Roberts left the apartment, defendant sought to hide the evidence of 
her attack, She talked to the children and Scott, telling them that if the police came and 
about the incident, they should »a\ llllhit RubetlLs "wis all cads hlcidmu \\\\\ mi In 
(linn1 inhi tin; ,pi|iiirliiKMil iiii Il llli.il iir WAS drunk (R UN I! Il \\ MM, also told the childi ei i 
to tell the police that they had been sitting on the couch in the front room, watching 
television when Roberts had come to the door (R, 109* 114) She then moved a couch to 
tn\ ci Iiii.: bbckl iluiih -li I1 '" ni 'f".' |. I Vlemliiil ,u,ii , (In; I iiilc slit" ir.nl In ".Lib 
Roberts to Seth .and told him to clean it off and hide it. Seth obeyed, hiding the knife 
inside the hollow metal frame of his bed (R.109:92-93,114-1S) 
One of several police officers responding to the scene, Otticei Larr> /iiiiiiin 
been stabbed at defendant's apartment (R. 109:72). Otiitti ZIIIHHU went to defendant J 
apartment and spoke with her briefly; defendant said that Roberts was already injured 
and bleeding \- ^: ^ a i n toil llial lit hi"k i It"1"! .lei". m U'IIMT -IM,; 
Defendant said that she had no im U«JI 
involvement in the incident (Id.). 
After speaking with Roberts at the hospital, Oliicer Zimrner returned lo ilie scene 
iiiihil iiiii'l Ikleitun r li'll '\mlusnn, uhn In nil iiiilnn unveil Invmn Sawmill* i and lack Scott 
\k.i09:82,88-89). I he officers together interviewed defendant. They asked dckiidoiil 
whether Roberts had, in fact, come into the apartment and stayed for a few mini ites 
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rather than just stepping inside and then leaving, as she had earlier asserted. Defendant 
then stated that Roberts had come in and used the telephone (R. 109:82). 
Detective Anderson asked defendant if she had stabbed Roberts. She denied it, 
insisting that she did not know how Roberts had been injured. She told the officers that 
she'd been watching a movie and Roberts had come to the door, knocked or rang the 
bell, and then barged his way in. She then pushed him out (R. 109:90). 
Defendant said she noticed that Roberts was bleeding when he first came in. 
Roberts was not complaining of his injury, however, but was asking who was there in the 
apartment. She said that sometime later, Roberts began complaining about the injury, 
and started yelling and screaming. She said that Roberts was only in the apartment for a 
short time (R.109:91). 
Defendant was arrested, and the police continued their investigation, interviewing 
defendant's children and recovering the knife Seth had hidden in his bed frame 
(R.109:91-93). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant is required to marshal all 
of the evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the 
verdict. Defendant fails to meet her burden to marshal the evidence both because she 
ignores significant evidence, and because she draws every inference from that evidence 
contrary to the verdict. 
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Further, even if the inferences that defendant seeks to draw are accepted, contrary 
to the verdict, these inferences do not imply that the jury's verdict is unreasonable. The 
verdict indicates that the jury accepted the victim's testimony that he was attempting to 
leave defendant's apartment when defendant stabbed him from behind. None of the 
inferences regarding the victim's alleged hostility that defendant now argues (even if 
accepted contrary to the verdict) undermines this testimony or the jury's rejection of 
defendant's claim of self-defense. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY'S VERDICT IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
Defendant asserts that the gijdence presentedgto the jury at trial i^ flwufficient to 
support the jury's conclusion that she did not act in self-defense when she stabbed 
William Roberts, and that the trial court therefore erred in denying her motion for a 
directed verdict. See Brief of Appellant, p. 9. To the contrary, the evidence presented by 
the State fully dispels any inference that defendant acted in self-defense, and the 
evidence presented by defendant to support her self-defense theory is both ambiguous 
and inherently contradictory. 
A. Defendant has not met her burden to marshal the evidence 
To properly challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant is required in her 
brief to acknawkdge the ftill extent of the evidence against her. "The burden is heavy on 
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$ defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant 'must first marshal all 
the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then demonstrate how this evidence, even 
viewed m the most favorable light, is insufficient to support the verdict.'" State v. 
Shepherd, 1999 Utah App. 305 f 25, 989 P.2d 503 (citation omitted) {quoting State v. 
Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994)). Reversal occurs "on|y_ y/h*n the evidence 
i§$o inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 'reasonable minds must have 
entertHmed~HTW5§onable doubt' that the defendant committed the crime." Strain, 885 
P.2d at 819 (quoting State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (additional 
quotations omitted)). See also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact 
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). 
In her brief, defendant acknowledges smng but not all, of the evidence presented. 
Defendant recites the facts testified to by the victim, but ignores the testimony by the 
other witnesses regarding her own actions and statements which provide additional 
evidence that she did not act in self-defense. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 12-15. Further, 
in describing the evidence presented, defendant draws every available inference contrary 
to the verdict: although Roberts testified that he did not threaten defendant at any time 
and was simply trying to leave the apartment when defendant stabbed him, defendant 
tries to argue that Robert's assertions are "incredulous" because of other evidence that 
she believes implies that Roberts had some hostility toward her. See Brief of Appellant, 
pp. 14-20 ("In light of such evidence, it does not require a significant inferential leap to 
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see that Robertsiwas extremely hostile . . .") . By failing to discuss evidence of her lies to 
the police and other attempts to hide her involvement in the stabbing, and by drawing 
broad inferences adverse to the jury's verdict, defendant has failed to marshal the 
evidence, and the court should not consider her sufficiency claim. 
B. The jury's rejection of defendant's self-defense theory was 
reasonably based upon direct testimony. 
As noted above, defendant failed to marshal all of the evidence supporting the 
jury's verdict, but her brief does acknowledge the testimony of the victim, William 
Roberts. Defendant characterizes this testimony in her brief as follows: 
The victim, Roberts, testified that Howell invited him to stay at her 
apartment for the weekend. When he arrived at the apartment, Howell 
began to verbally harass him about the fact that he did not answer her page. 
She also harassed him about a doll that he brought to her daughter. 
Roberts testified that Howell told him to leave the apartment a few 
times. Roberts unsuccessfully attempted to call his mother and a friend in 
order to find a place to go. Roberts then went into a back room to give the 
doll to Howell's daughter. Howell then approached Roberts with a knife. 
Roberts testified that he merely responded, "hey, don't worry, I'm out of 
here" and headed for the front door. Roberts was reaching for the front 
door, with his back towards Howell, when she came at him with the knife. 
Roberts turned around with his hands raised in a defensive posture when 
she stabbed him in his upper right arm. Roberts fell to the floor, started 
yelling, then left the apartment. 
Brief of Appellant, p. 12 (citations omitted). Even this limited description of the 
evidence is entirely sufficient to prove that defendant did not act in self-defense, since it 
proves that defendant stabbed Roberts from behind, as he was attempting to leave the 
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apartment. If this testimony is credited, as it was by the jury, there is ample evidence to 
support the verdict and reject defendant's claim of self-defense. 
To avoid the obvious significance of this testimony, defendant argues that the 
victim was not a credible witness, asserting on appeal the same general attack on the 
victim's credibility that was argued at trial and rejected by the jury. On appeal, the jury's 
assessment of the victim's credibility is not subject to weighing by this court. "We may 
not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility, but instead 'assume that the jury 
believed the evidence and inferences that support the verdict. ""State v. Chaney, 1999 UT 
App 309, f30, 989 P.2d 1091 (Utah App. 1999) (quoting State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 
(Utah 1993)); see also State v. Merila, 966 P.2d 270,272 (Utah App. 1998) ("It is not the 
function of a reviewing court to determine guilt or innocence or judge the credibility of 
witnesses.")- It is true that an appellate court may, "in some unusual circumstances," 
assess witness credibility. State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). However, 
such circumstances are limited to testimony that is "inherently improbable" in that there 
"must exist either a physical impossibility of the evidence being true, or its falsity must 
be apparent, without any resort to inferences or deductions." Id. Roberts' testimony 
does not describe actions that are physically impossible and is not obviously false. 
Rather, in attacking the victim's credibility, defendant resorts entirely to "inferences or 
deductions" from other testimony; possible inferences and deductions that were 
evaluated and rejected by the jury. 
10 
In challenging the victim's credibility, defendant draws broad inferences from 
three types of evidence: evidence of a loud argument between Roberts and defendant 
that evening, evidence of Robert's prior actions toward defendant, and evidence of 
provocation by defendant. None of this evidence reaches the core issue of the victim's 
credibility on the issue of whether defendant stabbed him from behind, and relies entirely 
upon inferences rejected by the jury. 
Evidence of the argument that night (Brief of Appellant, p. 14-16). Defendant 
describes at length testimony that implies defendant and Roberts were arguing loudly that 
night. At most, and drawing inferences adverse to the jury verdict, this evidence only 
implies that at trial, Roberts may have understated his level of agitation that night to 
some degree during his testimony. However, this evidence does not at all address the 
fundamental fact of guilt that the jury decided; i.e., whether defendant stabbed Roberts as 
he was trying to leave. In order to strengthen the inference, defendant asserts that there 
was evidence that Roberts "got physical" with her prior to the stabbing. Brief of 
Appellant, p. 16. However, this inference is largely based upon the testimony of Jack 
Scott, who also testified directly that defendant acted in self-defense (R. 109:172), and 
whose testimony was necessarily rejected by the jury as not credible. Defendant is left, 
therefore, with another inference (again, adverse to the verdict) based upon Jeremy 
Seegmiller's vague testimony that he heard "big bumps'9 on the ground from another 
room (R. 109:122-23). This evidence, even if believed, is not sufficient to support any 
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conclusion about Roberts' actions toward defendant, let alone sufficient to compel a 
conclusion that defendant acted in self defense at the time she stabbed Roberts. 
Evidence of Roberts' general hostility (Brief of Appellant, p. 17-18). Defendant 
asserts that the evidence shows Roberts was hostile and threatening in their relationship 
generally, citing Roberts' admissions that he was upset over defendant's infidelity, and 
quoting phone messages and a letter written by Roberts. These statements are of little 
relevance to the issue of defendant's claim of self-defense. The phone messages are 
profane, but do not in any way constitute threats of physical violence. Even defendant 
could not have considered them to be threatening to her, as it is undisputed that 
defendant called Roberts and invited him to spend the weekend with her, after the 
messages had been left. The letter likewise could not be construed as evidence of 
physical violence toward defendant; it actually constitutes an offer of money, a 
profession of love, and a proposal of marriage. However, even if one assumes, contrary 
to the obvious import of these statements and contrary to the inferences dictated by the 
jury's verdict, that defendant had some level of physical hostility toward defendant, that 
would not imply that the jury was unreasonable in finding that Roberts had turned to 
leave the apartment when defendant stabbed him from behind. 
Evidence of defendant's provocation (Brief of Appellant, p. 19). Defendant asserts 
that Roberts must have been lying when he denied physically attacking her, because her 
own "obnoxious" behavior inevitably would have angered him. Even this proposed 
12 
inference, however, does not support a further inference that Roberts therefore became so 
angry that he attacked defendant, requiring her to defend herself by stabbing him. At 
most, the irrational, provocative behavior by defendant that Roberts described provides 
only a possible inference (adverse to the jury's verdict) that Roberts could have been 
understating the extent of his own anger that night. More reasonably (and consistent 
with the verdict), however, this irrational behavior merely substantiates Roberts' 
testimony that defendant's attack on him was unprovoked. 
In essence, defendant is arguing that the jury's verdict should be overturned on the 
basis of an inference based upon another inference. First, defendant is asserting that the 
jury reasonably must have inferred that Roberts was hostile towards defendant on that 
evening, even in the face of contrary evidence. Second, defendant is asserting that, based 
entirely upon that first inference of hostility, the jury must also have inferred that Roberts 
must have acted in such a threatening way that defendant had to stab him to protect 
herself. 
* * * 
"When there is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from it, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can be reasonably 
made, our inquiry stops and we sustain the verdict." State v. Underwood, 737 P.2d 995, 
996 (Utah 1987). The jury accepted Roberts' testimony that he was leaving the 
apartment when defendant stabbed him from behind, and none of the evidence generally 
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attacking Roberts' credibility now cited by defendant is sufficient to overcome this basic 
finding by the jury. The jury was confronted with two conflicting versions of the events 
on that evening: one from William Roberts and one from Jack Scott. The jury believed 
Roberts.1 
As defendant acknowledges in her brief, "In cases involving issues of self-
defense, 'contradictory testimony, without more, is not grounds for reversal.'" Brief of 
Appellant, p. 14 (quoting State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1985)). The possible 
inferences defendant now argues should be drawn are contrary to the jury's verdict, and 
should not be considered on appeal. Nevertheless, even if these inferences are accepted, 
they do not render the direct testimony relied upon by the jury so "inconclusive or 
inherently improbable" as to be insufficient as a matter of law to support the verdict. 
Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, J30. 
1
 In order to believe Scott, the jury would have had to ignore the fact that Scott 
originally lied to the police, and would have had to believe that although Roberts 
traveled two hours by bus to visit defendant and brought a carefully chosen, sentimental 
gift for her and her daughter, upon arrival he immediately and angrily pushed his way in 
the apartment door and shoved defendant down the hall. Further, the jury would have 
had to accept the proposition that although defendant called and invited Roberts over for 
the weekend, she was afraid of him, and would have had to believe that although 
defendant thought she was justified in using the knife in self-defense, she nevertheless 
attempted to destroy the evidence, lied to police, and then instructed her children to lie in 
an attempt to cover up her actions. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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